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LABOR LAW REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND
ELLEN J. DANNIN *
Karl Klare has advocated the importance of attempting to "reconstruct
the inner logic of collective bargaining law" by struggling "to uncover the
moral and political vision embedded in the doctrines, the values and
images of justice and work place rights." 1 New Zealand has recently been
the stage for a particularly dramatic performance which lends itself well
to just such an investigation. Certain powerful forces there have promoted
major reformation of its labor relations laws by advancing a compelling
vision of New Zealand's future, which is attractive and seductive. An
analysis of the specific proposals, the ways in which they are advanced,
and the claims made suggests that the inner moral and political vision is
quite different, however. The disjuncture between the vision expressed
and this hidden vision raises questions as to the motives of those
championing these proposals and whether they can be unaware of the
discrepancies.
I. THE NEW ZEALAND LABOR SYSTEM2
The current pace of labor law reform in New Zealand has increased
to an all but annual pastime. Despite this, the only real changes prior to
*Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A., 1975, University
of Michigan; I.D., 1978, University of Michigan.
The author wishes to thank the Dan Long Library, Wellington, Massey University Library,
Palmerston North, and the New Zealand Business Roundtable for providing access to many of
the materials on which this article is based.
1. Karl Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQuE 65, 73 (David Kairys, ed. 1982).
2. The New Zealand labor relations system is quite different from that of the United States.
An understanding of the New Zealand system is important to understand the discussion which
will follow. For the reader who may not be familiar with it, a detailed overview of New
Zealand's labor laws, as they existed between 1987 and 1990, is provided in an appendix to
this article.
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1991 were essentially emendations of its seminal nineteenth-century
legislation, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of
1894-popularly known as the IC & A Act.' The importance of that act
in what we can now easily dismiss as a small, weak, far away country is
difficult to appreciate today. However, this was not always the view of
New Zealand. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
developments in New Zealand were closely watched in the United States.
Indeed, it provided inspiration to progressive forces in the United States
for decades after the enactment of the IC & A Act. The IC & A Act was
a model to progressives within the United States through the 1920's,4 and
it inspired the introduction of similar legislation in at least nine states.5
Now, late in the twentieth century, all this is nearly forgotten history,
both in the United States and in New Zealand. New Zealand's pride in its
progressive legislation and egalitarian system has given way to despair and
desperation amid economic and political turmoil. An important sign of
this turmoil was the revision of New Zealand's industrial relations
legislation, with the passage of the Labour Relations Act 1987 ("LRA")
by the Labour Government.6 That legislation temporarily served as the
3. See Gordon Anderson, A Summary of Industrial Law Research in New Zealand: 1970-
1986, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND:
LrrIERATURE SuRvEYs 101, 102 (Kevin Hince & Alan Williams eds., 1987).
The best summary of the minutiae of the amendments through the Industrial Relations Act
of 1973 is LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND (John Howells et al. eds.,
1974) [hereinafter LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS].
The IC & A Act was long interpreted, based on its full title, that its purpose was to
promote unionization of the work force. See Herbert Roth, Trade Unions, in LABOUR AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra, at 3, 7; Noel S. Woods, Industrial Relations Legislation in the
Private Sector, in LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra, at 81, 90. That reading
contrasts with the events surrounding the Act's birth. The tumultuous period after the
depression of 1880, with its disastrous impact on fledgling industries and consequent wage
undercutting, led to union militancy and then harsh repression after the failed 1890 maritime
strike. As a result, from 1890 to 1894, unions in New Zealand nearly ceased to exist. See
Roth, supra, at 3, 7; Woods, supra, at 82-83.
This changed quickly and dramatically. In 1889, universal male suffrage was enacted,
leading to the election of the progressive 1891 Parliament. See Woods, supra, at 83. (Among
its actions was woman suffrage in 1893.) As Roth stated: "The coincidence in time of strike
defeat and election victory fostered the belief that only through Parliament could workers gain
their rightful place in society." Roth, supra, at 7. The enormity of the change wrought by
this enactment cannot be overstated; it caused the removal of New Zealand industrial relations
from the common law system which was imperiling unions in the United States and Britain.
4. See PETER COLEMAN, PROGRESSIVISM AND THE WORLD OF REFORM: NEW ZEALAND
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERIcAN WELFARE STATE 132 (1987).
5. Id. at 134.
6. See infra part I; cf Kevin Hince & Martin Vranken, A Controversial Reform of New
Zealand Labour Law: The Employment Contracts Act 1991, 130 INT'L LAB. REV. 475, 477
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battleground for one of the most bitterly fought battles in that country's
history. However, with its passage, the discontent which had been a
major impetus for the LRA continued unabated.
Although New Zealand's labor law reform has implications as to the
nature of the society it has and will have, this discussion has curiously
taken place offstage. This debate has been shaped by relatively few
institutions, even accounting for the small size of the country. The
primary movers have been the employer associations: the New Zealand
Employers Federation ("NZEF") and New Zealand Business Roundtable
("NZBR"). Facing them and calling their ideas into question have been
relatively few, divided, and powerless individuals. As a consequence, the
vision advanced by the employer associations has stood virtually
unchallenged.
That vision, and the way in which it is described, stands as one which
all would accept as generally right and desirable. For instance, the
employer associations say the result of accepting their proposals would be
the creation of a productive, harmonious society without divisiveness or
waste. This vision shimmers on the horizon, depicted in impressionistic
hues. When they speak of themselves, the associations portray themselves
as selfless champions of the good, and society at large. These views
piggyback on visions we all share of our good society and its idealized
constituents.
There is clear evidence that not only is this vision attractive in the
abstract, but it also has been accepted at large in New Zealand. This was
demonstrated when the Labour Government enacted specific employer
association proposals in areas other than industrial relations, and to some
extent within the LRA, following the Labour Party's victory in 1984.
With the change of government in October 1990 and the conservative
National Party's ascension to power, this vision has now been fully
successful.7
(1991).
7. On May 15, 1991, the National Government's Employment Contracts Act 1991 became
effective. That success has the likelihood of overturning a system which has ordered industrial
relations in New Zealand for nearly a century, discarding what was long hailed as the most
progressive legislation of its kind.
Minimal substantive changes were made to the form of the Employment Contracts Bill.
See 43 PARL. DEB. (HANSARD) 1425 (1991). The effective date of the legislation was,
however, changed to May 15, from the controversial May 1. See DISPATCH, NEW ZEALAND
EMPLOYMENT LAW LIBRARY PERsoNNEL MANAGEMENT, (CCH), Employment Contracts Bill
Taking Final Shape 1 (Apr. 24, 1991).
Many of the provisions of the ECA match with great precision those advanced by the
associations and discussed herein. See Interview with Rick Barker, National Secretary of the
19921
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H. THE PAST PROCESS OF LAW REFORM
The employer associations' vision first had a major impact during the
process of legislation reform, which led to the enactment of the LRA in
1987. The LRA emerged from a two-year process, following the election
of the Labour Party in 1984.' The first step was the issuance of the
"Green Paper" by the Minister of Labour on December 17, 1985.1 It
identified areas for reform and solicited responses to specific questions." °
It was accompanied by a large second volume of analysis of then current
legislation." Responses were submitted by representatives of government,
unions, and employer organizations.
In addition to the employer associations and the government, one
other institution played an important role in the discussion: the Industrial
Relations Centre of Victoria University of Wellington ("IRC"). 2
The IRC, which conducts classes in the field of industrial relations
and also regularly holds seminars on issues of the day, held one such
seminar in preparation for the law reform in 1983, at which an employer
representative, Max Bradford,"3 voiced the essentials of what has
continued to be the employer associations position. He complained that
employers had to deal with too many unions, claiming that the average
employer had to negotiate with four or five unions. 4 He advocated
removing protections from unions, such as blanket coverage, state policing
Service Workers Federation of Aotearoa, in Wellington, New Zealand (May 14, 1992).
8. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
9. See N.Z. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
REVIEW, Vol. I (1985) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER].
10. See id.
11. N. Z. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
REVIEW, Vol. 11 (1985).
12. The importance of this institution cannot be overemphasized because New Zealand has
only approximately six academic lawyers who specialize in the area of labor relations. Q.
Anderson, supra note 3, at 101.
13. Bradford would come into greater prominence during the pendency of the Employment
Contracts Bill. He was named as the person to head up the Select Committee hearings when
he was but a newly elected MP. Branford's background working for the New Zealand
Treasury, the NZEF, and the National Party as its secretary-general meant he had a great deal
of experience in this area. See Mike Jaspers, On Course for the Top, NAT'L Bus. REV., Feb.
27, 1991, at 9; Patricia Herbert, Max Factor Behind the Birch Bill, THE DOMIION, Apr. 17,
1991, at 14. According to the NZEF director-general, it was Bradford who had initiated the
NZEF's move to deal with labor relations as part of its economic policy. See Roth, supra note
3, at 14.
14. See Max Bradford, Issues of Concern to Employers, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: ISSUES
OF CONCERN 14, 20-22 (Raymond Harbridge, ed., 1983).
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of awards, statutory compulsory unionism, state funding of $2 million a
year for mediation and arbitration services, and the existence of union
bargaining rights in perpetuity once a union was registered as a bargaining
representative. "
One other important institutional forum for the discussion of industrial
issues in New Zealand is the New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations.
This quarterly then operated out of the offices of the IRC but with
editorial board representation from the fields of academia, management,
and labor.16 During this period, from the early 1980s to the present, a
large percentage of its articles have focussed on the processes of law
reform taking place. Kevin Hince, the Director of the IRC, opined in its
pages that the process of law reform should focus on problems associated
with the national award system; should encourage individualism,
entrepreneurship, and choice; and should maintain "a framework of a
social unity of purpose."17 This phraseology echoes, without analysis or
consideration, the campaign of the employer associations.
All these institutions were active in preparing comments, lobbying,
and conducting evaluations following the issuance of the Green Paper. In
September 1986, the Minister of Labour issued the White Paper, which set
forth the parameters of the Labour Relations Bill,"8 which was itself
introduced in December 1986.19 The LRA was enacted on May 27, 1987,
essentially in its White Paper form, and became effective on August 1,
1987.20 The statements issued by the Minister of Labour concerning
15. See id. The issues articulated by Bradford have remained on the employer association
agenda since that time, with the exception of state policing of awards, a function transferred
to unions under the LRA. The concern that the government had too great a role to play in
industrial relations is a common leitmotif. Ronald Miller, an American visitor to the IRC,
however, concluded that he found no evidence to support claims of dependency on government
intervention. Rather, he concluded, grievances and negotiations both were frequently resolved
privately. See RONALD MILLER, THE RESOLUTION OF DIsPUTES AND GRIEVANCES IN NEW
ZEALAND 19 (1983).
16. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 102. New Zealand's four law schools all publish law
reviews, but it is exceedingly rare for them to publish anything in the field of industrial
relations. Those which do appear tend to concentrate on common law aspects of employment,
a field which oddly is now of far greater significance, including in legislated areas, than in the
United States. Id. at 101.
17. Kevin Hince, The Management of Industrial Relations, 11 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 11, 12
(1986).
18. See N.Z. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON LABOUR
RELATIONS (1986) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
19. Martin Vranken & Kevin Hince, The Labour Court and Private Sector Industrial
Relations, 18 VICTORIA U. WELLiNroN L. REv. 105, 115 (1988).
20. Labour Relations Act, § 1 (1987) (N.Z.).
19921
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the revision were generally pro-labor, as one would expect from a Labour
government with strong historical ties to the union movement. For
example, the White Paper rejected the employer associations' exaltation
of the United States as a useful model and lamented that in the United
States the work force was only eighteen percent union.21
"The Government does not want to see the same trend develop in
New Zealand. Unions, in particular, have a vital role to play in the
management of change so that their members' interests are adequately
protected. Such protection must be based upon effective internal
organization and democratic procedures. " 2
Although this is the sort of statement one would expect a Labour
government to issue, it was, however, quite unique for its period. At that
time, the Labour government was dominated by the views of Roger
Douglas, Minister of Treasury, who, after 1984, elsewhere transformed
the government on terms advocated by Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher?
The influence of "Rogernomics" was not wholly absent from the field
of labor law reform. It can be seen elsewhere in the White Paper. For
example, after the Minister of Labour bemoaned the lack of consensus on
recommendations and noted the sharp differences between unions and
employers,' he then berated unions in terms which, we shall see, are
those used by the employer associations. He criticized unions for being
overly dependent on legislative support; offering a limited range of
services to members; not being sufficiently accountable to their
membership; resisting organizational change; and showing reluctance to
coordinate their activities at the level of the work place.'
He also chided employers for failing to recognize the importance of
wage fixing and industrial relations to their economic performance; failing
to put forward a case to support their particular objectives; blaming unions
for problems actually caused by poor management; and considering unions
as having no role to play in decisions affecting their members' lives.26 All
21. See WHrTE PAPER, supra note 18, at 1.
22. Id.
23. See generally THE MAKINO OF RoGERNoMIcs (Brian Easton, ed. 1989). For a detailed
discussion of the forces involved in the enactment of the Labor Relations Act, see Patrick
Walsh, A Family Fight? Industrial Relations Reform Under the Fourth Labour Government, in
THE MAKING OF ROGERNOMICS, supra, at 149; see also Hince & Vranken, supra note 6, at
477.
24. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 18, at v.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1-2.
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these criticisms will be examined in this analysis of the associations'
specific proposals.
In issuing these criticisms the Minister of Labour stood almost alone,
for no one else at that time or in later years took the opportunity to
examine in any detail the agenda being promoted by the employer
associations. This left the employer associations' impressionistic vision of
the productive and harmonious New Zealand to permeate New Zealand
thought in this area and eventually to gain wide acceptance.
The power of this vision can be seen in that, despite the Labour
Minister's criticism, many of the items targeted for change reflect what
was a thoughtless adoption of many of the employer association agenda
items. These included targeting: (1) "relativities" of wages among
awards; (2) unions' reliance on the Arbitration Courts as causing unions
not to bargain; (3) the award system's causing wages to be negotiated at
the rate the poorest employer could pay, resulting in depressed wages; (4)
unions' failure to consider what the country as a whole could afford; (5)
second-tier bargaining; (6) the proliferation of contracts at each job-site;
and (7) unions' failure to develop more effective structures to deal with
government, employers and members.28 Put in fairly simplistic terms, it
might be fair to say that the employer associations won more through the
LRA than did unions or workers. The discussion had moved to the
ground articulated by them and the debate took place on their terms.
In order to promote these changes, the LRA created a system that
encouraged an exit from the traditional award system to agreements. It
did this in several ways. Unions which sought second-tier agreements
would lose award coverage for the foreseeable future. They could only
achieve higher wages for members who had received them under second-
tier bargaining by pulling them out of the award system.29 The Minister
claimed this would increase wages and, in turn, would create competition
27. The Arbitration Court developed a system of relativities by aligning wages in relation
to one another across industries. After 1919, this practice was formalized as Standard Wage
Pronouncements, which were then applied to awards. General Wage Orders, which came into
existence in 1922, set minimum wages and applied to all agreements. See Woods, supra note
3, at 94, 95.
28. See Raymond Harbridge & Stuart McCaw, The First Round Under the Labour Relations
Act: Changing Relative Power, 14 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 149, 151 (1989); WHrrE PAPER,
supra note 18, at 1-3; see also Ian McAndrew, Bargaining Structure and Bargaining Scope in
New Zealand: The Climate of Employer Opinion, 14 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 133, 133 (1989);
NEw ZEALAND PLANNINO CouNcIL, ECONOMIC MoNrToRING GROUP, LABOUR MARKET
FLEXIBILITY 5 (1986) [hereinafter FLEM rLrrY]; Alexander Szakats, Some Comments on
Legislation in the Private Sector, in LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at
147, 148-49.
29. Cf Labour Relations Act §§ 152-55 (1987) (N.Z.); see infra note 220.
1992]
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with those paying at the lower award rate, gradually increasing the award
wage.30 Composite agreements were offered as attractive alternatives to
unions, since they did not freeze a union out of future award coverage if
the experiment proved unsatisfactory. This composite agreement also
satisfied employer desires to decrease the number of agreements covering
the work place.
The Labour Minister's second goal was met by limiting access to the
Arbitration Commission to employers and unions who mutually agreed to
its authority.3" The tripartite wage conference was supposed to be the
fourth goal. Finally, the withdrawal of government supports plus the new
minimum union size requirement was supposed to increase union power
and independence.32 As a whole, the structure's supporters referred to it
proudly as a decentralized bargaining structure."3 A decentralized system
had long been the organizing principle of the employer associations. In
this case, however, the associations used other descriptions and girded
their loins anew for battle. They felt cheated and angry that the new
legislation did not go far enough in rectifying a situation which they
claimed left them powerless before the unreasonable demands of overly
powerful unions.
III. LuE UNDER THE LRA
In the years since 1987, the associations have complained bitterly
about the failure of the LRA to rectify what they perceive as an imbalance
of power.34  However, no evidence has been advanced to support the
existence of such an imbalance. In any case, the LRA existed for less
30. Cf. FLExmILrrY, supra note 28, at 21.
31. Labour Relations Act § 147 (1987) (N.Z.); see infra note 214 and accompanying text.
32. WHITE PAPER, supra note 18, at 3.
33. See McAndrew, supra note 28, at 133; Harbridge & McCaw, supra note 28, at 152.
An overview of the new system is discussed in VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CENTRE, NEw ZEALAND SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1989)
[hereinafter NZ SYSTEM].
This fairly benign interpretation of the new system is disputed by Peter Brosnan and Frank
Wilkinson. They claim that the entire purpose of these reforms was to lower wages through
the opting out provision from awards; the abolition of the government's inspection of wages
to ensure employers were paying the award rate; concurrent attacks on the public sector
through its corporatization and privatization; the abandonment of the concept of fair relativity;
support for mandatory youth rates and Saturday and Sunday shopping; the pursuit of policies
that permitted a tripling of unemployment from 1984 to 1988, thus increasing the competition
for even the lowest paid jobs; making the unemployment benefit more difficult to get; and
subsidizing employers that did not pay a living wage. See PETER BROSNAN & FRANK
WILKINSON, Low PAY AND THE MINIMUM WAGE 40-43 (1989).
34. See infra part IV.
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than four years, a period too brief to know what its impact on industrial
relations would ultimately have been. By 1989, however, several
preliminary studies had been conducted which did not support any claim
of an impotent employing class at the mercy of workers.
Dr. Raymond Harbridge commenced a periodic survey of collective
bargaining documents-awards and agreements-with the 1986/1987 wage
round." He found that average wage increases of only 7.3% had been
achieved when inflation was at 16.9%.6 He also concluded that the
employer associations' claim that awards failed to be organized on an
industrial basis and consequently failed to be responsive to industrial needs
was untrue." In short, Harbridge inferred that employers possessed a
high degree of power even before the LRA could have had any impact.
Harbridge's second study examined registered documents to determine
whether there had been any increase in "flexibility," that is whether work
rule restrictions were being decreased. 8 He found that in the 1986/87
wage round eight percent of documents registered changed working time
arrangements; whereas in the 1987/89 round, thirty percent (191 of 588)
did.39 In addition, these changes were more likely to exist in agreements
than in awards and were accompanied by higher rates of pay than in the
relevant award.' These findings suggest one reason employer associations
were eager to abolish the award system.
A third study found there had been twenty five percent fewer
settlements of all kinds during the 1987/1988 wage round and that wage
rates ranged from $142 to $989 a week. 41 Twenty settlements (of which
35. See Raymond Harbridge, The Way We Were-A Survey of the Last Wage Round
Negotiated Under the Industrial Relations Act 1973, 10 N.Z. J. Bus. 49, 55 (1988).
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id. The NZEF expressed confidence shortly thereafter that the LRA was leaning
towards work place agreements which had resulted in moderate wages being negotiated for
1986/87. See NZEF, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1987). Thus, Harbridge's findings concerning the
industrial nature of awards casts doubt on one of the most important current tenets of
association belief.
38. Raymond Harbridge & Michael Dreaver, Changing Patterns of Working Tune
Arrangements in Registered Collective Agreements in New Zealand, 14 N.Z. J. INDUs. REL.
251,253,257 (1989); accord Mike Clark, Award Renewals, THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers
Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 1989, at 5 (noting that as of that date most awards
provided for below inflation wage increases of four percent, while in over 50% of agreements
employers were able to attain significant control over hours of work and the employment of
temporary, casual, and part-time workers).
39. Harbridge & Dreaver, supra note 38, at 253.
40. ld at 255.
41. Harbridge & McCaw, supra note 28, at 156, 158, 160. The NZBR claimed that in the
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thirteen were awards) were below the minimum wage of $225 a week.42
The study further concluded that employers had demonstrated their ability
to get changes in hours of work clauses without conceding wages; had
been able to hold to a restricted wage path for the entire wage round, that
is, to keep increases low, and had prevented backdating of documents and
the payment of retroactive raises. 43  Employer power also was
demonstrated in that no unsettled dispute was referred for voluntary
arbitration.'
A final study by Ian McAndrew found the beginning of concession
bargaining in 1988 award negotiations with proposals for pay
simplification, work-rule flexibility, and no-cost or low-cost settlements.45
IV. THE ASSOCIATIONS' CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE THE LRA
Despite the employer associations' criticisms, the LRA marked an
important victory for them and for their ideas. Not only were the terms
of discussion framed as they had been advanced by the associations, but
they were adopted by the Labour Party, marking their acceptance even by
those who should have been their ideological opponents. However,
although they achieved ideological endorsement, partial enactment of their
program in the LRA, and the achievement of many of their goals under
the LRA, the associations reacted as though they had achieved nothing and
had even been betrayed. Their pronouncements manifested the strength
of their desire for further change. They vigorously advocated complete
abolition of the award system (and its replacement with work place
agreements), outlawing compulsory unionism, eliminating exclusive
representation rights of unions, abolishing the Labour Court, and
1987/88 wage round "relatively few new cases of citing out occurred" (citing out means that
a union has agreed that an employer need not be covered by the relevant award and that
negotiations will take place for an agreement) and but "a handful of new composite
agreements, notably in the motor vehicle industry, were negotiated." NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT IN THE 1988/89
WAGE ROUND 8 (1989) [hereinafter REVIEW]. They, however, offered no figures but relied
apparently on anecdotal information. They also claimed that the 1988/89 wage round saw no
increase in the momentum of change from awards. Id.
42. Harbridge & McCaw, supra note 28, at 158.
43. Id. at 161.
44. Id.; accord REVIEW, supra note 41, at 4.
45. McAndrew, supra note 28, at 136.
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obliterating structures they claimed were based on a fallacious belief that
the interests of employers and the employed were not identical.'
The associations have never explained more than the contours of their
proposals nor why the proposals would have the claimed effects. At every
challenge, they fall back on their portrait of a New Zealand that would be
productive and harmonious but for the divisive and wasteful actions of
unions.
Before moving to an examination of the specific proposals, it is
important to comment on the tone and style of the employer association
agenda. First, their proposals, speeches, and position papers are
remarkably repetitious. The same anecdotes, phrasings, and claims appear
in document after document, occasionally with a change in geography or
company name to suit the particular audience or speaker. Second, at least
in their public issuances on labor relations, they never support their claims
with facts, studies, or explanations and, consequently, the claims strike at
least an expatriate as exaggerated. Unexplained statistics are given and
claims about other countries are made-all without crucial information,
such as the names of the countries, or years, data bases, or the like.
Where other countries are mentioned, a thoughtful reader will easily
conclude that claims advanced about them are either untrue or omit factors
so crucial to assessing the claim that they are highly misleading. The tone
of the documents is strident and hostile to those who might oppose them.
The thrust of their contentions is easily summarized. They claim that
New Zealand's system of labor relations is unique and thus is to blame for
the country's recent economic failings.47 They claim that abolishing this
uniqueness will result in flexible, decentralized bargaining enhancing,
"through productivity, the returns for both investment of labour and
investment capital." 4" The countries which New Zealand must emulate
46. See infra part IV.F.
47. See, e.g., Roger Kerr, Letter to the Editor, DOMN'ION, Dec. 5, 1989, at 10; Ronald
Trotter, New Zealand Labour Market Reform: Class Struggle or Productivity Struggle?
[hereinafter Class Struggle], in NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, LABOUR MARKETS
AND EMPLOYMENT: NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENTS ON LABOUR
RELATIONS 8-9 (1988) [hereinafter LABOUR MARKETS]; Douglas Myers, Industrial Relations:
A Better Way [hereinafter A Better Way] in LABOUR MARKETS, supra, at 6-7.
48. Submissions of the AZEF to the Royal Commission on Social Policy: Summary, THE
EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Feb. 1988, at 1; see Lindsay
Fergusson, Labour Relations: The State of the Debate, Speech given at the Institute for
International Research Conferenceon Managing Change in Industrial Relations (Aug. 17, 1989)
(on file with the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.); The Labour Relations Bill, THE
EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 1987, at 1-6; Clark, supra
note 38, at 5; LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, passim; see also Bill Birch, untitled article,
1992]
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are usually not named, and where they are, the United States, Japan, and
Switzerland are the most frequently cited.49
A. Voluntary Versus Compulsory Unionism
Compulsory unionism is the first item on the associations' agenda.5 °
Their arguments against it most often raised four points. First, they claim
that New Zealand is unique as "one of a very few OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries that now insists on
this outdated practice."" Second, they claim to be concerned for worker
THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), June 1987, at 5, for the
similar position of the National Party.
49. After the Conservative government came to power in October 1990, it moved quickly
to introduce legislation modeled on the employer associations' model. It is the campaign by
the associations that is the focus of this article. Consequently, that legislation, where relevant,
will only be noted.
The Employment Contracts Bill's targeted effective date was May 1, 1991, that is, May
Day. The purpose of the bill was to provide freedom of association; allow employees to
determine who should represent their interests in relation to employment issues; enable
employees and employers to choose to negotiate individual or collective contracts; and establish
"a new and efficient regime in relation to employment contracts in New Zealand." It also
repealed all legislation providing support for and legitimacy to unions. This impression is
reinforced by its use of terminology. For example, the word "worker" from the LRA is
replaced by "employee" although both use the same definition and neither the word "union"
nor any similar word appears. See Employment Contracts Bill (1990) (N.Z.).
50. See e.g., Clark, supra note 38, at 5; Peter Carroll, The Wage Round, THE EMPLOYER
(N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 1988, at 3; NZEF, ANNUAL REPORT
3 (1988); REVIEW, supra note 41, at 6; Athol Hutton, Labour Market Reform and the Labour
Relations Act, in LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at 6. This has not always been the case.
As late as 1983, when the National Party Minister of Labour introduced a voluntary unionism
bill, many employers objected to it on the ground that it would damage harmonious work place
relations and cause a waste of time and production. PETER BROSNAN, VOLUNTARY UNIONISM
2-3 (Peter Brosnan, ed., 1983) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY UNIONISM].
The Employment Contracts Act eliminates compulsory unionism and prohibits the use of
any compulsion, including termination of employment as a consequence of refusing to become
a union member. See Employment Contracts Act 1991 §§ 6-8 (1991) (N.Z.).
51. See e.g., Peter Horton, Labour Market Reform and the Labour Relations Act, in
LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at 7; Hutton, supra note 50, at 6; Roger Kerr, Industrial
Relations After Rogernomics-Why There Has to be a Better Way [hereinafter After
Rogernomics], in LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at 3; see also Fergusson, supra note 48,
at 6-7; NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, SUBMISSION TO THE LABOUR SELECT
COMMrrTEE: THE LABOUR RELATIONS BiLL 6 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 SUBMISSION]
("Experience in [countries such as the US] also demonstrates the fallacy to the claims in the
New Zealand debate that compulsory unionism is needed to protect workers and defend wages.
Unionism is voluntary and rates of unionization in Japan and the United States are below 30
and 20 percent respectively.").
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freedom.5 2 Third, they claim voluntary unionism will improve the services
unions provide for their members. s3 Finally, the associations contend that
voluntary unionism is part of a program of reforms "aimed at establishing
a free and decentralized system of contracting" and that it would facilitate
"individualised forms of contracting which suit workers whose needs vary
from the norm."'
This is often candidly linked to eliminating unions from the work
place:
In logic, the starting point for a worker should be the decision
whether or not to join a union for the purpose of collective
representation (or other benefits), or whether to negotiate
acceptable arrangements on an individual basis .
Unionization makes little sense where work patterns and
preferences are diverse, individual incentives matter and few
economies are obtained from collective negotiation, monitoring
and enforcement of bargains. 5
The portrait presented is thus one of altruistic-or even
paternalistic-concern for the welfare of the worker and unions, coupled
with contempt for the latter. The presentation is completed by a dash of
civil libertarianism respecting the uniqueness of the individual.
52. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 51, at 7; Michael Loach, Freedom in Employment, in
LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at 8, 13-14. When told that an employer refused to agree
to compulsory membership "on principle," Judge Simms responded that he did not understand
what the principle was and stated that the same argument is used by employers every time, and
yet he had been unable to discover the principle. Patrick Walsh, Union Membership Policy
in New Zealand: 1894-1982, in VOLUNTARY UNIONISM, supra note 50, at 15, 16; Cf Peter
Brosnan et al., Democracy and Decision Making in Unions of Employers, 7 N.Z. J. Bus. 1,
10 (1985).
53. See, e.g., Fergusson, supra note 48, at 6-7; Loach, supra note 52, at 13-14; REVIEW,
supra note 41, at 6.
54. Fergusson, supra note 48, at 6-7; accord NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE,
FREEDOM IN EMPLOYMENT: WHY NEW ZEALAND NEEDS A FLEXIBLE DECENTRALIZED
LABOUR MARKET 7 (1987) [hereinafter FREEDOM]; NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE,
NEW ZEALAND LABOUR MARKET REFORM: A SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE TO THE GREEN
PAPER "INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW" 47 (1986) [hereinafter GREEN
PAPER SUBMISSION]; REvIEW, supra note 41, at 6; Douglas Myers, Labour Market Reform:
Getting It Right, in LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at 9 [hereinafter Getting It Right]; Jim
Rowe, Implications of Voluntary Unionism: The Employer's Perspective, in VOLUNTARY
UNIONISM, supra note 50, at 27, 29.
55. 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at 6.
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A search for the hidden moral and political vision must begin with an
examination of the associations' views of the proper function of unions.
The NZBR stated that view:
In no way can our proposals be construed as anti-union. Trade
unions reflect the need to have associations in many
circumstances, not least to minimise the costs of negotiating and
enforcing agreements. They can also provide valued services to
members. What is at issue is the form of many unions, which is
often divorced from the common interests of a workplace, and
the lack of effectiveness stemming from protected positions.
Unionization should not be forced on groups in the economy
where such arrangements are not relevant. But in an
environment where unions were free to adapt their structures and
compete for the provision of services, their vitality,
responsiveness and democratic accountability to members could
only be enhanced. 6
This and similar statements demonstrate a contempt for unions as
unrepresentative 57 and collective bargaining as irrelevant.5" Other
statements suggest that the associations view unions as an impediment in
achieving their economic objectives of lowering wage costs.
The central issues in any labour relations regime are its rules
governing the way employees represent themselves individually
or collectively in contracting with employers, and the rules
governing the way contracts are struck. The issue for public
policy is to determine a regulatory environment which facilitates
job creation and higher living standards by allowing workers to
compete for jobs and employers to compete for workers, with the
lowest possible costs of contracting."
Statements such as this suggest that, although the discussion is most
often expressed as concern for the associational rights of workers, the
debate is actually about economic power. It has been observed that those
56. Class Struggle, supra note 47, at 9.
57. See, e.g., Ronald Trotter, National Party Industrial Relations Policy, in LABOUR
MARKETS, supra note 47, at 4 [hereinafter National Party].
58. Fergusson, supra note 48, at 9.
59. 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at 8-9.
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who support or oppose compulsory unionism often do so because they feel
this is the primary way unions maintain or increase their power in relation
to employers.' This motive appears to inform the terms of at least part
of this debate and to account for at least one part of the associations' real
vision.
The associations' claims with regard to protecting the interests of
workers have been put to an interesting test, since New Zealand workers
have had several opportunities to vote on union security clauses. In 1977,
national government legislation led to elections among 195 unions with a
collective membership over 405,000, which was sixty-five percent of all
unions and over eighty-one percent of all union members to vote on the
issue of retaining compulsory unionism."1 Not one clause was eliminated
as a result, and the overall vote was in excess of eighty-nine percent in
favor.6 2
Workers "went to the polls" again in 1984, as a consequence of the
National Party's Industrial Law Reform Bill, which directly outlawed
compulsory unionism.' 3 Most unions lost only between one and five
percent of their members during that period, with some of those losses
actually attributable to redundancies as opposed to refusals to join.64 The
unions that lost the most members were those which predominantly
represent women and part time workers.'
Under the LRA, employees voted on compulsory unionism if
employers refuse to agree to a union membership provision. 6 As of
October 18, 1989, forty-four ballots had been held, approximately ten to
twenty percent of those which are likely to be held, and all supported
including union membership provisions.' As of February 13, 1990,
seventy ballots had been held, all supporting compulsory unionism.6
60. See CHARLES HANSoN ET AL., THE CLOSED SHOP 9 (1982).
61. J.M. Howells, For or Against Compulsory Unionism? Recent Ballots in New Zealand,
122 INT'L. LAB. REV. 95, 100 (1983).
62. Id.
63. Raymond Harbridge & Patrick Walsh, Legislation Prohibiting the Closed Shop in New
Zealand: Its Introduction and Consequences, 27 J. INDus. REL. 191, 199-200 (1985).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 201.
66. See Labour Relations Act, §§ 58, 61-69 (1987) (N.Z.).
67. Carol Fuller, The Functioning of the Labour Relations Act 1987-Unions, in
EVALUATING THE LABOUR RELATIONS AcT 1987 14, 14 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1989); see
also REVIEW, supra note 41, at 6.
68. See Letter from M. E. Feely, Deputy Registrar of Unions, to Ellen J. Dannin (Feb. 13,
1990) (on file with the N. Y. L. ScL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.).
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The major argument raised by the associations-and a common thread
in all of them-is that everywhere but New Zealand workers have
complete freedom of choice as to whether to join a union. 69 Anyone
familiar with American labor law no doubt is surprised to learn that there
is no compulsion in the United States for workers to join unions or support
them with their dues. A simple reading of the National Labor Relations
Act will dispel that fallacy.7 °
What then is the situation in the rest of the world? Is New Zealand
unique, or does compulsory unionism exist outside New Zealand (and the
United States)?71 Not only is compulsory unionism widespread,72 but
compulsory payment of union dues even by nonmembers-something not
provided for in New Zealand-is accepted practice in countries, such as
Canada, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.73
New Zealand is not even unique among developing countries in having
union security arrangements.74 They still accept as true the view that most
New Zealand employers once held, that compulsory unionism was in their
interests by leading to less work force unrest and militancy."
When one knows that New Zealand workers actually have a greater
ability to opt out of union membership or payment of a dues equivalent
and that they have already voted on this issue on a number of occasions,
the concern the associations express for them appears either misplaced or
a subterfuge. Nonetheless, the associations assert with almost fanatical
conviction that New Zealand is unique in having compulsory unionism,
despite clear and easily accessible evidence that this is simply untrue and
despite the fact that, in certain respects, New Zealand provides more
liberal opting out provisions than does the United States. How did the
associations get it so wrong? It should have been easy for them to have
69. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
70. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1988).
71. It must also be remembered that the LRA does not make compulsory unionism truly
compulsory. Sections 82 and 83, for example, provide for exemptions from membership.
Labour Relations Act (1987) (N.Z.).
72. See E. Cordova & M. Ozaki, Union Security Arrangements: An International
Overview, 119 INT'L LAB. REV. 19, 28-29 (1980); see also Donald E. Cullen, Recent Trends
in Collective Bargaining in the United States, 124 INT'L LAB. REV. 299, 306 (1985).
73. See Cordova & Ozaki, supra note 72, at 28-29; Cullen, supra note 72, at 306.
74. Cordova & Ozaki, supra note 72, at 24.
75. See VOLUNTARY UNIONISM, supra note 50, at 2-3; Richard Rudman, Employer
Organisations: Their Development and Role in Industrial Relations, in LABOUR AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 61-63; cf Harbridge & Walsh, supra note 63, at
202; see generally HANSON ET AL., supra note 60, at 13.
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done the research to have unearthed accurate information. Many NZBR
members have overseas holdings, and should have firsthand experience
with foreign systems. This inaccuracy is a thread running through all the
discussions which follow and is important in seeking out the actual moral
and political vision of the associations.
B. Voluntary Representation
The second item on the associations' agenda is to eliminate continued
and exclusive representational rights for unions. The associations make
several arguments in support of this proposal. Their fundamental
argument is that they seek to protect workers' rights to choose their
representatives. They contend that New Zealand workers are denied
freedom of association if they are represented by unions which they
personally may not have recently selected.76
The associations argue that free choice will permit the marketplace to
provide the best representative form, since "changes to union registration
rules [will] enable alternative groupings, responsive to member interest,
to emerge on a competitive basis."" They dismiss the possibility that
"active competition between unions to provide services" to workers could
be disruptive and promote the idea that workers should be able "'to
determine their own best interests in deciding on union services, just as
they freely choose to. engage other professional services.'""
As with union security clauses, the associations tout this idea as being
in the best interest of unions: "The standing of trade unions in the
community would be enhanced if the monopoly privilege they enjoy were
withdrawn, and the allegiance and loyalty of their members were attracted
on a voluntary basis. " They deny that the result would be weakened
worker representation and welfare."0
76. See REvIEw, supra note 41, at 7; GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION, supra note 54, at 48;
Fergusson, supra note 48, at 9. The Employment Contracts Bill provided that any person
could negotiate an individual employment contract at any time, § 9(e), and that any person
claiming to be another's representative must establish that it represents each such person for
each negotiation, § 11(1).
77. Class Struggle, supra note 47, at 9; see also Horton, supra note 51, at 6; Hutton, supra
note 50, at 7.
78. National Party, supra note 57, at 3; cf. Employment Contracts Bill § 9 (1991) (N.Z.).
79. Getting It Right, supra note 54, at 17; accord Hutton, supra note 50, at 7.
80. 1987 SumMISSION, supra note 51, at 4. The representations made by the associations
dismiss such fears, although, as can be seen by the following, their own statements support the
legitimacy of such concerns.
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This proposal, at first reading, suggests fostering a multiplicity of
representational groupings within the workplace as each employee
exercises full and frequent choice of freedom of association. This would
occasion such a major change in the current system that the practical effect
is unclear. It could lead to the British system in which many unions
represent an employers' workforce, depending on their extent of
organization. At least some evidence has shown that this tends to lead to
greater workplace strife and militancy, with competing unions engaging in
demarcation disputes, creating the need for frequent negotiation, with a
concomitant waste of time and production.81 It seems unlikely that most
employers would find this desirable. The concern expressed for worker
freedom of choice perhaps should not be taken at face value insofar as this
proposal is concerned. At least in speeches to themselves, the associations
reveal that the competition envisioned would not be limited to workers'
exercising choice as to their representative. It would extend to
nonemployees' competing for the jobs of those currently employed. The
end of that competition would be to lower wage costs. This connection
is explicitly expressed by the associations in speeches that decry the
problem of "current registration rules [which] put obstacles in the way of
people from outside unions, such as the unemployed, offering to provide
work at a lower price. "82
Union representatives argued against the formation of enterprise unions and
"contestibility" on the grounds that "sweetheart" unions would develop and
disruptive inter-union rivalry would occur. The self-interested and empty nature
of these claims are illustrated by the following observations on the harmonious and
highly productive Japanese industrial relations system by a member of the United
States Council of Economic Advisers:
'Why do Japanese unions allow a degree of flexibility that would be an
anathema to American unions? The reason: they are organised companywide
rather than industrywide. Because national unions in Japan rarely control locals'
policies, a single industry contains several different "enterprise unions" as they are
called, and these unions compete with one another. Workers will moderate wage
demands rather than jeopardise their firm's market share.'
Id. at 9-10.
81. See P. K. EDWARDS, CONFLICT AT WORK: A MATERIALIST ANALYSIS OF WORKPLACE
RELATIONS 145 (1986); VOLUNTARY UNIONISM, supra note 50, at 2-3.
82. A Better Way, supra note 47, at 7. They return to this idea in a number of speeches,
usually accompanying the idea of competition with a cut in wages. "Why can't a young
unemployed kid in Gisborne go to an employer and say: 'Give me a chance, take me on for
six months at half the going rate, let me learn and see what I am worth at the end of that
time?'" Douglas Myers, New Zealand Labour Market: Breaking Moulds, in LABOUR
MARKETS, supra note 47, at 6 [hereinafter Breaking Moulds].
Another symptom-Why can't an unemployed kid in this region [Nelson] go
to an employer and ask for a chance of taking him or her on the payroll at a special
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Other remarks by the associations further undercut the value of
freedom of choice. Employees would have full freedom of choice;
however, "membership of a particular union by a majority of workers in
a particular workplace would [not] confer on a union an automatic right
to bargain."83 Any worker representative in such a position would find it
difficult to be effective.
Interestingly, however vigorously the associations express their
support for worker self-determination, full freedom of choice would be
completely incompatible with another association goal of having only one
workplace representative.8" Logic suggests that one cannot have full
freedom of choice if there is only one choice.
The associations' claims with respect to representation also raise the
issue whether workers in other countries are permitted absolute unfettered
freedom to choose their form of collective bargaining representation. The
United States has implicitly rejected just the sort of system that the
association espoused in the American legislative scheme of the National
Labor Relations Act. Thus, the NLRA provides for exclusive
representational rights of unions, 5 as do many countries.8 6
The dishonesty of this proposal is striking. Other proposals and
association statements make it clear that there is no intention to allow what
is promised. Furthermore, although the associations claim that this
rate to learn something and establish a relationship with the employer, which may
lead to a permanent job? Just such a start could be the key to becoming a
responsible citizen and climbing up the income ladder.
Loach, supra note 52, at 8.
83. See The Labour Relations Bill, THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation,
Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 1987, at 3. That submission continues: "The system would not
preclude an existing union from selection as the bargaining agent. However, removal of the
registration/representation linkage would ensure that a union, having gained the right to
negotiate, would be far more accountable for its actions and subject to far greater worker
control." Id. A review of the representative's status would take place every three years. Id.
at 4.
The Employment Contracts Bill provided another route to weaken union representation
by permitting workers to form an individual contract during the term of a "collective
employment contract." See § 9(e). The possibilities for undermining union representation are
obvious. An employer could offer a few employees attractive terms during the life of the
collective agreement. Although the terms of the individual contract would not be effective
during the life of the collective contract, § 13(3), an employee who had such an agreement in
hand, one which was unavailable because the union stood in its way is an employee unlikely
to support the union thereafter. Other employees also aware of this problem would also find
it more difficult to support the union. Cf. § 14(4).
84. See infra part IV.C.
85. National Labor Relation Act §§ 7, 9(b) (1991); 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 159(b) (1988).
86. See Cordova & Ozaki, supra note 72, at 26.
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proposal would benefit workers and unions, other statements demonstrate
that the hidden objective is to lower wages and create compliant bargaining
partners.
C. Award Coverage
If there is any one aspect of the traditional New Zealand system which
most arouses the associations, it is the award system. Employer
organizations complain bitterly that awards have not been outlawed in
favor of enterprise bargaining,87 also referred to as decentralized labour
relations.88  The NZBR makes several arguments to support the
elimination of the award system as a system which creates uniform
minimum wages and other working conditions across the country or
regions.
First they raise the uniqueness argument, claiming: "Uniform
national agreements are virtually unknown outside" Australia and New
Zealand.89  Second, they next raise altruistic motives benefitting
employees: The associations claim eliminating awards would improve
employer-employee relations.' Furthermore, they argue, awards have a
destructive effect on the economy. According to NZBR member Lindsay
Fergusson, "[B]y and large real progress towards arrangements that
improve productivity and safeguard jobs is only possible outside the award
system."91 The employer organizations claim to speak as advocates for
87. Clark, supra note 38, at 5; Peter Carrol, The Wage Round, 113 THE EMPLOYER (N.Z.
Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 1988, at 3; N.ZE.F. ANNUAL REPORT 3
(1987); REVIEW, supra note 41, at 7-9; 1987 SUBISSION, supra note 51, at 5-6 (suggesting
that New Zealand is unique in the organization of its unions). Historically, award blanket
coverage was welcomed by employers because it ensured a level field with no competitor being
able to undercut another. FLEXIBILITY, supra note 28, at 47.
88. See, e.g., Submissions of the NZEF to the Royal Commission on Social Policy:
Summary, THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Feb. 1988, at 1;
GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION, supra note 54, at 5, 44.
89. Ronald Trotter, Reforming the Labour Market-Idle Dreams or Real Prospects?, in
LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at 9 [hereinafter Idle Dreams]; accord Fergusson, supra
note 48, at 1; 1987 SuBMISSION, supra note 51, at 5-6; Hutton, supra note 50,at 4; Horton,
supra note 51, at 8; National Party, supra note 57, at 4.
90. See, e.g., Ronald Trotter, Government Policy Statement on Labour Relations, in
LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at 2 [hereinafter Government Policy]. As Athol R. Hutton
states: "There is no incentive for Waitaki to have good relations with our employees when
they delegate the task of representing them to outside officials and we ask a person whom we
don't employ to undertake out negotiations. I am irresponsible to allow this to continue to
happen." Hutton, supra note 50, at 4-5.
91. Fergusson, supra note 48, at 4.
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the poorer employers in favoring the elimination of the award system.'
They contend that awards do not take into account ability to pay.93
Finally, they argue that the award system is too complex and results in
confusion if multiple agreements or awards apply in one workplace.'
Support for the eradication of the award system does not include all
the ranks of employers, however. When they discuss the fact that many
employers prefer the award system, the associations dismiss them in highly
antagonistic terms. Only those employers who are poor managers could
be opposed, they say, claiming they simply do not want to have to "talk
to their own people" or to treat them "as people with their own individual
needs and aspirations, not commodities for sale at a fixed price established
by some national award . .. .
The NZBR exalts the United States and Japan as monolithic and
successful models of enterprise bargaining systems.96 In doing so, at least
as far as the United States is concerned, they have managed to overlook
highly important bargaining structures which have features nearly identical
to those the associations criticize within the award system. They ignore,
for instance, the existence and importance of multi-plant and multi-
employer agreements in the United States and in Japan.97 They overlook
92. See, e.g., 1987 SuBMISSION, supra note 51, at 13-14; Bradford, supra note 14, at 20;
Dennis Rose, Introduction: The Pursuit of Full Employment: Macroeconomic Perspectives,
11 N.Z.J. INDUS. REL. 65, 73 (1986).
93. See, e.g., 1987 SUBMMSSION, supra note 51, at 13-14; Bradford, supra note 14, at 20;
Rose, supra note 92 at 73.
94. See, e.g., 1987 SUBMISSION, supra, note 51, at 13-14; Bradford, supra note 14, at 20;
Rose, supra note 92, at 73.
95. Breaking Moulds, supra note 82, at 8; accord Fergusson, supra note 49, at 11; REVIEW,
supra note 41, at 11.
96. FREEDOM, supra note 54, at 10; Loach, supra note 52, at 10. See, e.g., After
Rogernomics, supra note 51, at 3; Idle Dreams, supra note 89, at 10; Ronald Trotter, Political
and Economic Change in Britain and New Zealand, in LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 47, at
7 [hereinafter Change]; 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at 5-6.
97. Wallace Hendricks & Lawrence Kahn, The Determinants of Bargaining Structure in
U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 181, 198 (1982). In 1980,
33.6% of nonmanufacturing contracts were multi-employer and 13.9% were multi-plant. When
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing are combined, 40.4% are multi-employer. RICHARD
FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS Do? 39 (1984); Milton Derber, Employers
Associations in the United States, in EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
79, 83-93 (John Windmuller & Alan Gladstone eds., 1984).
In Japan, multiemployer bargaining exists in industries such as shipping, steel, railways,
printing, and textiles. See KEITH SISSON, THE MANAGEMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 171-72 (1987); Levine, Employers Associations in Japan,
in EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 319, 346-53 (John Windmuller &
Alan Gladstone eds., 1984).
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similar forms which dominate major United States industries such as
automobiles and heavy industry, such as pattern and coalition bargaining,
national contracts, and master contracts.98 They further fail to grasp the
impact of union bargaining on wage setting by nonunion employers who
model their wages and benefits on those in union contracts." Similarly,
they disregard the importance of Japanese coordinated or pattern
bargaining in setting working conditions." °°
Not only do they ignore these important Japanese and American
institutions but also the many factors which influence the level at which
bargaining takes place. These include national traditions, the structure of
employer and employee organizations, the level at which employee
solidarity is felt, the size of the country, issues, tactical considerations,
and economic conditions. 1 '
Although the associations appear oblivious to these facts, it may be
that they actually are not. When one looks more deeply into the
advantages to be gained from their proposed structure, one sees that the
system argued for actually would work most to the benefit of the larger,
stronger employers and would weaken further the less powerful and less
stable.
No bargaining structure necessarily provides an advantage to all
unions or to all employers. Employers with a vertical, multi-plant
structure may prefer a multi-plant agreement, since a strike at one plant
will mean a stoppage of all production."0 Multi-employer bargaining may
compensate for small employers' power deficiency and may also lower
bargaining costs." °3 Multi-employer bargaining recognizes that most
employers negotiate with an eye on their competition by ensuring that
competitors will have made the same deal and will be hit with a strike or
lockout at the same time, making it impossible for a rival to take one's
98. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 97, at 35, 39; SISSON, supra note 97, at 18-22.
In private sector British companies, nearly half bargain at a multi-employer level. See also
Alison Booth, The Bargaining Structure of British Establishments, 27 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL.
225, 231-32 (1989).
99. Cf. 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at 6.
100. See SiSSON, supra note 97, at 171-72.
101. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: RECENT TRENDS AND PROBLEMS 28 (1977). It is worth noting
that although in the United States, the NLRB certifies unions at the local level, the
development of larger units for bargaining has resulted from employer and union agreement
that these aggregated structures are of more benefit to them.
102. See Arnold R. Weber, Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective Bargaining,
in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 13, 21-22 (Lloyd Ulman ed., 1967).
103. See Weber, supra note 102, at 19; Booth, supra note 98, at 226.
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market share.'O When technological or economic changes occur, multi-
employer bargaining can more successfully resolve ensuing problems.105
Employers dominant in an industry are likely to prefer single
employer bargaining, feeling they can best negotiate alone. They may also
make a high settlement hoping their competitors will be forced to follow
the pattern and be put out of business."° On the other hand, enterprise
bargaining may lead to disarray in the workplace and increased work
stoppages. 107
The hidden logic within the associations' advocacy of this reform
demonstrates that they are agitating for changes which benefit the largest,
most powerful employers within the country. The factors which
demonstrate this are, first, their professed ignorance of foreign practices
and, second, their obfuscation of the impact of such a change of level of
bargaining.
Certainly, the antagonism they show employer opponents is striking.
Although the associations claim to be acting in the interests of the weaker
employers, they take an uncompromising stand, denigrating the motives
of employers who prefer to bargain through the award system as the best
means of protecting their specific needs rather than simply acknowledging
the legitimacy of differing views.1"8 Similarly, they hide the reality that
it is the smallest, weakest employers-the ones not represented by the
NZBR-who are most likely to be disadvantaged.
Perhaps most curious-and nearly lost in the fervor of the
associations' rhetoric-is the fact that the LRA did not prohibit employers
from entering into enterprise agreements. It is easy to lose sight of this
fact, given the associations' insistence that they are unable to achieve
enterprise agreements through negotiations. 109 The issue appears to be
104. Accord OTTo KAHN-FREUD, LABOUR AND THE LAW 132 (1977); see Booth, supra
note 98, at 226; Weber, supra note 102, 15-17; GREEN PAPER, supra note 9, at 22;
FLEXMiLITY, supra note 28, at 47.
105. See, e.g., PAUL WILLMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY 138 (1986).
106. See Booth, supra note 98, at 227. But cf. NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE,
Evaluating the Operation of the Labour Relations Act, in THE 1988/89 WAGE ROUND 11-12
(1989) [hereinafter Evaluating].
107. See SOLOMON BARKIN, DIVERSITY AND COMMON CHALLENGES ON THE WESTERN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SCENE 13 (1981); Hince, supra note 17, at 17.
108. Based on submissions to the LRA 1987, the Department of Labour commented that
discernible differences of opinion existed within the management sector. See WHITE PAPER,
supra note 18, at v.
109. Cf Harbridge & Dreaver, supra note 38, at 257. They have acknowledged this only
once and then only to deny that they could. 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at 15.
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unwillingness to achieve this end through negotiations rather than an
inability. All employers had to do under the LRA to have enterprise
agreements was to offer inducements and persuasion to fellow employers
and unions that such an agreement was desirable. Their lack of success
was not the fault of the LRA but rather that employers had failed to
convince their bargaining partners.
D. Single Union Bargaining
As was mentioned above, the associations advocate having all
employees of one employer represented by a single representative' 10
which, they add, would not necessarily be prohibited from joining in
regional or national associations."' Thus, the NZEF proposes beginning
the process of determining representation anew, discarding longstanding
representation relationships. This cumbersome process is designed to
eliminate union participation in the process. First negotiations would be
held at the workplace between workers and their employer on the
composition of the unit." This would then be referred to a third party if
they could not agree. 1 They would then hold a secret ballot to decide if
Not only do their proposals in this area ignore the range of options already open to them
under the LRA, they have also mischaracterized the nature of the bargaining that then took
place. One analyst suggests that, in fact, most awards and agreements negotiated already were
more closely attuned to workplace needs, since most were actually single industry documents.
Harbridge, supra note 35, at 55.
110. FREEDOM, supra note 54, at 5; GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION, supra note 54, at 45; The
Labour Relations Bill, THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Apr.
1987, at 4-5; NEW ZEALAND BusINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GREEN
PAPER: AN EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE: SUMMARY OF THE SUBMISSION BY THE N.Z.
EMPLOYER FEDERATION 2 (1985) [hereinafter NZEF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE] ("The proposed
new system would result in all of the workers in an organised workplace being employed under
one agreement."); Horton, supra note 51, at 6, 11; Hutton, supra note 50, at 3; Idle Dreams,
supra note 89, at 8; National Party, supra note 57, at 4.
111. Class Struggle, supra note 47, at 9.
112. See NZEF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE, supra note 110, at 3. The NZBR apparently
would extend this to require representation of managerial staff as well.
There is an equally strong argument that all people involved in a company's or
enterprise's operation should be able to belong to some ollective arrangement.
The majority of our management and supervisors have come up through the ranks
and were members of the union. I happen to be one of them. Is there any reason
why they shouldn't still be allowed to joih?
Hutton, supra note 50, at 6-7.
113. See EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE, supra note 110, at 3.
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the unit would be constituted for bargaining.11 4  An agent would be
required to represent the entire work force." 5 Thus, the core of the
proposal is the elimination of more than one union in the workplace, even
if an employer employs a multiplicity of classifications.
The tenor of the arguments made for this proposal are similar to those
already discussed in many respects. For example, its proponents again
ignored analogous foreign structures. United States law promotes
employee freedom to bargain collectively in a unit appropriate to that
purpose. By not mandating one form of bargaining unit, the United States
thus implicitly recognizes that a plant-wide or employer-wide unit is not
invariably the ideal form in which to organize collective bargaining.' In
the health industry, for example, although Congress mandated no
proliferation of bargaining units, the Supreme Court has approved the
NLRB's conclusion that seven units are now presumed appropriate in
hospitals." 7  No other industry even has a requirement of non-
proliferation.
Although having more than one bargaining agent may entail multiple
negotiations, the NLRA mandates that employees are best represented
within a unit performing like work under similar conditions as opposed to
being amalgamated in a group with diverse interests." 8 In addition,
workers may prefer to be represented by a union which has expertise in
dealing with that occupation's workplace conditions.
As with the associations' other proposals, there is little support for
their claims. Not only do systems abroad operate in a different manner
than suggested, this proposal is completely incompatible with the full
worker freedom of association they also espouse. Furthermore, it denies
the validity of workers' need for expertise in personnel matters, the sort
of expertise which, in other contexts, employers seek out in their own
representation." 9 Finally, it ignores advantages to employers in different
forms of representation. For example, having more than one unit of
representation may enable an employer to continue operations during a
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988).
117. See American Hospital Assoc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 111 S. Ct. 1539
(1991); 29 CFR § 103.30 (1991).
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988).
119. See, e.g., N.Z. Airline Pilots' Association Industrial Union of Workers v. Registrar
of Unions, WLC 73/89 (Aug. 22, 1989). There the issue was the use of pilot union members
as employer representatives in labor relations matters, including discipline. In that case, the
employer claimed it needed current pilots to administer its policies effectively. Id. at 38.
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strike by being able to divert work to facilities with a different unit of
organization that are not being struck.
E. Labour Courts
In all senses of the word, the Labour Court is a peculiar target of the
associations. Not only does it perform a useful role as a body with
expertise in the field, neither it nor its predecessor has taken any action
which should have been so controversial as to warrant the enmity
expressed towards it. Nonetheless, the associations advocate its
elimination and vesting the civil courts with the Labour Court's
jurisdiction. 2 ° The Labour Court's structure is similar to that common to
European countries and most of the world.' The United States, of
course, does not have a tripartite structure in its most analogous structure,
the National Labor Relations Board, but does retain it in certain arbitration
situations.
Labor courts are specialized bodies which represent an understanding
that industrial law must develop free from common law contract and tort
concepts, since common law historically has proven itself inadequate to
deal satisfactorily with common events in the workplace.1 22 Common law
contract concepts may create a Procrustean bed of mutuality and freedom
of contract not suited to the industrial reality which requires that one party
to the relationship remain subservient to the daily and ever changing
demands of the other.123  To create law specifically applicable to the
120. GREEN PAPER SuBMISSION, supra note 54, at iii, iv, 5-6, 11, 32, 40, 47; Class
Struggle, supra note 47, at 9; A Better Way, supra note 47, at 8; National Party, supra note
57, at 5; Hutton, supra note 50, at 7-8; Horton, supra note 51, at 11; 1987 SUBMIsSIoN, supra
note 51, at 20.
While the Employment Contracts Bill did not eliminate the Labour Court, it did,
however, severely limit its jurisdiction by making it more of an appellate court with jurisdiction
limited to questions of law in many instances. §§ 34(4), 35, 70(1)(d)-(e). Employment
Contracts Bill (1991) (N.Z.).
121. Benjamin Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A Selective
Comparison, 39 LAB. & INDUS. REL. REv. 35, 36-37 (1985); Vranken & Hince, supra note
19, at 121-22.
122. Margaret Wilson, A Few Observations on the Law Relating to Security of Employment,
in THE INDUSTRIAL LAW SEMINAR 1 (Legal Research Foundation 1979); cf. JAMES B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 13, 14, 94 (1983); ROBERTO
M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 71-73 (1983).
123. Cf. I.T. Smith, Is Employment Properly Analysed in Terms of a Contract?, 6 N.Z.U.
L. REv. 341, 341, 342, 365 (1975); see also Idle Dreams, supra note 89, at 3. "An
employment relationship should be a relatively straightforward deal. An employee is
essentially offering his or her labour services to a willing buyer, on terms and conditions which
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industrial context and then leave its interpretation and application in the
hands of civil judges will inevitably lead to an admixture of concepts for
which the law was enacted to rid.124
The judges of the Labour Court are conscious of the need to ensure
that New Zealand's industrial law is applied in a manner consistent with
reality and the purpose of the legislation. At his swearing in, Chief Judge
Goddard stated:
I am conscious of the task that confronts me. The Labour Court
plays a unique role in promoting and advancing harmony in the
workplace. Harmony leads to productivity and productivity leads
to more jobs, but it does more than that. It also conduces to that
caring, tolerant and just society for which we all long ....
This Court uses special techniques of dispute resolution. Most
of its cases are decided not according to rigid or inflexible
absolute rules of law but according to equity and good
conscience. What this means is not generally understood.
Equity is fair play in action. Equity and good conscience
involves an ethical approach to the Court's work on a case by
case basis. It involves the Court in a persuasive as much as a
coercive role and in a protective one in suggesting improved
standards of conduct in the workplace, leading to that high level
of mutual trust and confidence between employers and workers
and between workers and their fellows necessary for the effective
functioning of industry. 15
Common law concepts of the primacy of private property and
employer prerogative favor employers."2 6 Naturally, the associations favor
a return to it at the expense of developing a body of law directly relevant
to the nature of modem industrial life. To do as they propose would be
are periodically renegotiated." Id.
124. Lord Wedderburn, LabourLaw: From Here to Autonomy?, 16 INDUS. L.J. 1, 13-14,
16-17 (1987); cf. KAHN-FREUD, supra note 104, 12-13, 14, 162. These laws have tended to
favor employer interests. PATRICK WALSH, Summary, in EVALUATING THE LABOUR
RELATIONS ACT 1987, 25 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1989).
125. Herbert Roth, On the Industrial Front, INDUs. L. BULL. 30 (1989).
126. Wedderbum, supra note 124, at 13-14; accordSmith, supra note 123, at 365; See also
NZ SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 17. Atleson observes that the common law courts have
essentially implied into the formation of the employment contract a presumption that the
employer has the right to seek to create the largest possible gap between the yield of its assets
(i.e., workers) and the cost of hire. See ATLESON, supra note 122, at 14.
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to set back the clock, returning to a system which should have been
irrelevant to New Zealand since 1894, when it opted for a statutory system
of labour law.127
F. Continued Representation
The associations propose discontinuing the representational status of
unions at the expiration of awards to permit employers to offer individual
contracts to workers in competition with the union. 128 They claim "that
the overwhelming majority of the OECD countries have labour relations
systems based on collective bargaining in the unionised sector coupled
with voluntary unionism and individual contracting. " ' The NZBR
further claims that, "the development of non-unionised arrangements" is
permitted elsewhere,"' without specifying important information, such as
where, and without examining the context in which it might exist.
Such a system, assuming that the workers were not so powerless as
to be unable to resist any employer offer, appears likely to create chaos
in the workplace by undercutting stability. The associations' proposal
would mean that agreements and past resolutions of work-place problems
would have no significance. In fact, without a stable partner, long range
planning and goals might well be sacrificed for short term gains to the
detriment of all in the business. Employers with a weak work
force-weak because of levels of unemployment, lack of specialized skills,
or with high numbers of women or minorities-could use such a system
to rid itself of an organized presence in the workplace by simply
demanding workers accept whatever terms it wishes to offer. Those with
127. See Gordon Anderson, The Reception of the Economic Torts into New Zealand: A
Preliminary Discussion, 12 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 89, 91-92 (1987).
128. The Labour Relations Bill, THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington,
N.Z.), Apr. 1987, at 3; FLEXIBLTY, supra note 28, at 55 (1986); GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION,
supra note 54, iv, 6-7, 47; Horton, supra note 51, at 8. The NZEF sees the norm moving to
individual employment contracts in the smaller work places. See NZEF EMPLOYER
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 110, at 3.
129. After Rogernomics, supra note 51, at 3; see 1987 SuBMISSION, supra note 51, at 6,
13-14; Fergusson, supra note 48, at 6-7; Hutton, supra note 50, at 3; Loach, supra note 52,
at 8, 13-14 ("Workers should . .. be provided the opportunity for individual contracts."); A
Better Way, supra note 47, at 10; Getting It Right, supra note 54, at 2; Breaking Moulds,
supra note 82, at 6; National Party, supra note 57, at 2. It is interesting to note that a favorite
term of the associations, "freedom of contract," was held by Otto Kahn-Freud to be "the term
the law uses for the subjection of the worker to the power of management .... " KAHN-
FREUD, supra note 104, at 12-13.
130. GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION, supra note 54, at 49.
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more organized and resolute work forces who, nonetheless, wished to
throw off unions could engage in a one-time fire sale to rid themselves of
a union presence in an atmosphere of uncertainty as an employer waged
negotiations on several fronts. Bitterness and uncertainty, the seeds of
industrial unrest, would be the likely result.
Second, contrary to the NZBR, it is not the norm among its
exemplars to permit employers to bargain with individual employees at the
termination of a collective bargaining agreement to persuade them they
should deunionize. Certainly, in the United States it would be a violation
of labor law, since employers are prohibited from dealing directly with
employees."' The action contemplated by the associations could even be
a violation of § 8(a)(2),132 depending on what action they actually
undertook. 13
G. The Question of the Commonality
of Employer and Worker Interests
A major tenet to the associations can be summed up as the idea that
collective bargaining is an old form of relations that does not fit the new
reality that employer and employee interests are one and that this one
interest is in increasing workplace productivity.134 Thus, New Zealand
industrial relations legislation should be cleansed of the concept that
employer and employee interests are in conflict. The associations argue
that workers and unions in other countries now have a closer identification
with the employer. 135 They vehemently deny claims that such workers are
131. See, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 678
(1944).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
133. Indeed, the failure of the LRA to have any provisions requiring good-faith bargaining
or even requiring bargaining at all, cf. Air New Zealand, Ltd. v. NZ Air Line Pilots Assoc.
IUOW, WLC 41/89 (May 25, 1989); NZ Insurance Trust and Life Agents' IUOW v. Lombard
Insurance Co. Ltd., ALC 3/89 (Feb. 7, 1989), may have been its greatest weakness.
Employers could not be compelled to bargain, and they actually had an incentive to prolong
negotiations. Once an award expired, the union was vulnerable to predation and thus more
likely to settle at a lower level.
134. Cf. 1987 SuBMISSION, supra note 51, at 10. It is interesting to note that former
Securities Commissioner Peter Ratner questions whether New Zealand's company directors
actually act in ways to promote productivity. He stated that they feel responsible to other
members of the "Wellington Club" and not to shareholders. Thus New Zealand had suffered
from a "sharemarket-by-etiquette" under which directors "took a particular action because
otherwise [they] would be expelled from the Wellington Club for 'conduct unbecoming to a
gentleman.'" See James Weir, NZ Suffers from Directors' 'Illusions,' DOMION, Nov. 30,
1989, at 17.
135. See Horton, supra note 51, at 8; Hutton, supra note 50, at 4; Getting it Right, supra
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at a bargaining disadvantage136 and characterize the LRA as legislation
falsely "based on the premise of an inherent on-going conflict of interest
between employers and workers,"137 which they term a "shibboleth and
source of confusion." 3 ' They claim finally that the United States has
abandoned such philosophies. 39
The short answer is that there has been no such legislative change in
the United States. Of course, some employers and unions have entered
into cooperation agreements, just as those in New Zealand could and did
under the LRA.'4 Certainly, their argument that cooperative systems are
fundamentally different and incompatible with a strong collective
bargaining system has generally been discredited and rejected in the United
States. 141
V. UNCOVERING THE INNER VISION
The examination so far engaged in demonstrates that the stated
purpose of the associations' agenda is false. The falsity of this stated
purpose may reveal dimensions of the vision on which it is based, which
belies its superficial appeal. We have touched on the hidden vision
embodied in these proposals, but we have yet to examine its dimensions
in full as it is expressed in the collective agenda. That vision is based on
an ideology which was new to New Zealand and which broadly
note 54, at 16; Idle Dreams, supra note 89, at 9.
136. See Getting it Right, supra note 54, at 7-8.
137. Horton, supra note 51, at 9; see 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at ii; The Labour
Relations Bill, THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 1987,
at 1.
138. Getting it Right, supra note 54, at 7-8; see 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at 4.
139. See, e.g., Evaluating, supra note 106, at 14; FREEDOM supra note 54, at 5; NEW
ZEALAND BusINEss RELATIONS, CRITIQUE OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS AcT 2 (n.d) (stating
that conflict models "have long since been abandoned in" countries such as the United States);
GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION, supra note 54, at 15; accord Hutton, supra note 50, at 4. Such
a statement is clearly untrue. See, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 97, at 221-39; see
also 1987 SUBMISSION, supra note 51, at ii, 4, 6; GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION, supra note 54,
at 15.
140. See, e.g., NZEF, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1988) (discussing the Nissan Way Agreement
providing for employee participation, union input into planning, and productivity awards).
141. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABoiR-
MANAGEMENT COOPERATION, SECOND INTERIM REPORT (1987); see also William Cooke,
Improving Productivity and Quality Through Collaboration, 28 INDUS. REL. 299, 313 (1989),
(concluding that in fact these programs work best with a strong union involvement).
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encompassed the role to be played by unions, workers and employers
should it achieve fulfillment.
The way the associations deal with the subject of unions is very
instructive, particularly their claims as to the actual and ideal functions of
unions. As can be seen by the arguments set out earlier, the topic of
unions is never absent from their statements. They often raise the issue
of the impact their proposals would have on unions in order to
demonstrate that the proposals are nonpartisan. A good example of such
a statement would be their frequent claims that a change would benefit
unions.
Gleanings from their proposals and statements, however, support a
conclusion that they actually have a very negative view of unions, their
independence, and their power. First, many of their statements
characterize unions as forces alien to the workplace and whose interests
are actually inimical to the workers they claim to represent. One
frequently sees statements such as this: "'[Tihere is considerable evidence
that too many union officials do not genuinely represent the interest of
significant parts of their membership, and their motives for resisting
moves to enable workers to exercise freedom of choice are very clear."' 42
They see unions as irrelevant and as hostile to furthering true worker
sentiments and desires and often claim that, but for the intervention of
unions, there would be no workplace disagreement. 4" The associations
see determining terms and conditions of employment as a function that can
effectively and properly be left to the employer and workers," with
unions playing a relatively minor role if and only if the major players
decide there is one for them.'45
The capacity they hope to assign to unions, should their proposals
succeed, is as a sort of personnel agency providing services to
"customers" on a competitive basis: "The bottom-line test of the
142. National Party, supra note 57, at 4; accord Andy Gregory, Unions-Friends of Their
Members, THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 1989, at 3;
cf Loach, supra note 52, at 5, 7; Getting it Right, supra note 54, at 4-5. Coupled with this,
they characterize unions as hostile to the interests of the impoverished. For example, they
reached this conclusion by claiming that unions had shown no interest in the plight of the
unemployed by citing the union's responses to the LRA resisting association desires to
eliminate minimum conditions of work, see Breaking Moulds, supra note 82, at 6; 1987
SUBMIsSIoN, supra note 51, at 25, and that unions support the minimum wage, which the
association claimed that the unemployed and low waged oppose, see Loach, supra note 52, at
14; Change, supra note 96, at 13; A Better Way, supra note 47, at 12-13.
143. See sources cited supra note 142.
144. NATIONAL PARTY, supra note 57, at 2.
145. LINDsAY FERGUSSON, supra note 48, at 9.
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performance of any employment relations system is a simple one: [sic] is
it achieving high levels of employment and high levels of productivity
growth?" 1" One often reads association statements such as: "Thorough
reform of the system, including breaking down barriers to [interunion]
competition, will transform unions in much the same way that the
deregulation of product markets has transformed business in New Zealand
and made it more productive and responsive to consumers." 4 7 A second
group of statements claim unions are illegitimate since they owe their
existence to statute. 148 This is ironic since most members of employer
associations are corporations and also owe their existence to legislation.
Corporations were created by legislative action to do what otherwise
would not be legal. A corporation is nothing but an aggregation of capital
given the legal status of a person and permitted to do business while not
making those who benefit responsible for its actions. 149 Indeed, but for the
protections in law provided to corporations, unions might be
unnecessary.1 50 Unions are aggregations of people which came into
existence to permit workers to deal effectively with the aggregations of
capital that permitted the corporate form.151
What the associations hope to see is a system of workers and
employers free to engage in unfettered contracting at the lowest possible
cost, thereby resulting in an increase in the measure of productivity. 52
Combined with the associations' other proposals, one can but conclude that
what they seek is a system which essentially excludes what we know as
unions.
This raises not only the political question of what balance of power
should be struck between unions and employers but also a philosophical
issue, one challenging the function of institutions which exist in and as
part of democracies. Democracy requires diverse interests, opinions, and
views and a process of robust discussion and election. 15  This goal was
146. REVIEW, supra note 41, at 15.
147. Class Struggle, supra note 47, at 10; see Breaking Moulds, supra note 82, at 9.
148. See GREEN PAPER SUBMISSION, supra note 54, at 7; cf. Lord Wedderburn, Labour
Law Now: A Hold and a Nudge, 13 INDUS. L.J. 73, 78-79 (1984).
149. See GORDON ANDERSON, supra note 127, at 94-95; Wedderburn, supra note 124, at
21; see also Paddy Ireland et al., The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law, 14
J.L. & Soc. 153 (1987). Legally, a corporation is an entity with an existence independent
from its shareholders while at the same time it is also viewed "as an object which is cleansed
and emptied of them." IRELAND, et al., supra at 149-50.
150. Cf Martin Vranken, Comment, 11 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 7 (1986).
151. BARKIN, supra note 107, at 2-3.
152. 1987 SUBMISION, supra note 51, at 8-9.
153. See John Decks, Ideology and Industrial Relations in New Zealand, 1 N.Z. J. INDUS.
[Vol. 13
LABOR LAW REFORM
promoted through the LRA. If employers had particular goals, all they
had to do to achieve them was to make a persuasive case to the union and
their workers. If the unions were not persuaded, it was not the legislative
system which had failed. It simply meant that the case had not yet been
made.
The associations' proposals suggest they are unwilling, however, to
engage in that sort of discussion with unions as equal partners. They
sought a system that would give them virtually unfettered control. They
espoused cooperative programs, ironically, only as a means of making
their proposals sound benign to worker interests, while furthering the
associations' goals of greater profits. However, should it be that such
programs are not successful in improving productivity as they hope,
legislative change based on these ideas are likely to leave New Zealand
employers with virtually unfettered control and workers with little in the
way of protection.
The current focus on cooperative workplace systems reflects the
contemporary desire to seize on certain aspects of the Japanese system
which might account for that country's recent economic success.
Employer associations have turned to employee involvement schemes to
increase productivity. This is, no doubt, reinforced by the natural
tendency of chief executives to explain industrial conflict as poor
communication, 154 concentrating on conflict in terms of gross measures,
such as work stoppages. 5
When, however, these programs have been used as a technique to
increase production, as New Zealand employers plan, and not to
incorporate true participation, 56 they often decline.157 The problem is that
an employer cannot both express respect for its workers, as the
REL. 26, 27 (1976); cf ATLESON, supra note 122, at 44-45. New Zealand employers tend to
want to relegate unions to a very minor role. See McAndrew, supra note 28, at 142-43.
154. See EDWARDS, supra note 81, at 20.
155. See Brian Brooks, Some Reflections on Industrial Conflict in New Zealand, in LABOUR
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 204, 205.
156. See David Smith, A Critique of Worker Participation in New Zealand, 3 N.Z. J.
INDUS. REL. 71, 71, 79 (1978).
157. See Charles Elliger & Bruce Nissen, A Case Study of a Failed QWL Program:
Implications for Labor Education, 11 LAB. STUD. J., 195,201-02 (1987). Similarly, grievance
systems set up without union involvement have been found insufficient to replace those
provided by unions because employees fear reprisals or feel they are ineffective since a high
percentage of decisions uphold management's original decision. See FREEmAN & MEDOFF,
supra note 97, at 108-9.
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associations do, yet claim that their choice of union representation is not
legitimate.
1 58
This, however, is exactly what the associations advocate. This
attitude, that employers should have virtually absolute control of the
workplace, is deeply held by them. A poll of New Zealand managers'
willingness to negotiate decisions, ranging from those with clear
applicability to working conditions to those more closely related to classic
managerial decisions, disclosed a desire to maintain tight control in all
areas.1 59 Over eighty percent believed management alone, without any
union involvement whatsoever, should make decisions concerning
nonsupervisory promotions, task assignment, contracting out work,
introduction of new machinery and technology, plant relocations and
closings, and layoffs. 1" The only issues in which at least half were
willing to allow some union involvement were scheduling (48.6%), rules
of conduct (39.2%), and safety (21.6%).161 Indeed, so strong was the bias
towards unilateral decision making on the part of management officials that
nine of twelve areas polled were felt to be properly in management's sole
control by seventy to ninety percent of those questioned. 62
158. See Smith, supra note 156, at 74. Stifling union input as a conduit for worker views
may have disastrous effects. These include absenteeism, labour turnover (now frequently
termed "exit voice"), tardiness, accidents, poor performance, high wastage, lack of care of
equipment, demoralization, working to rule, and even purposeful sabotage. This lost
productivity can be more costly than strikes. However, since it is difficult to measure it is
easily ignored, as the statements by the associations demonstrate. See Brooks, supra note 155,
at 205; GEOFF BROWN, SABOTAGE: A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 380-81 (1977);
EDWARDS, supra note 81, at 10, 37, 50, 73, 249, 256 (1986); WILLMAN, supra note 105, at
202; NZ SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 13; Deeks, supra note 153, at 31; John Howells, Industrial
Conflict in New Zealand-The Last Twenty Years, in LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
supra note 3, at 161, 175; Folke Schmidt, Industrial Action: The Role of Trade Unions and
Employers' Associations, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 2, 26-
28 (Benjamin Aaron & Keith (Lord) Wedderburn eds., 1972); cf ATLESON, supra note 122,
at 36-39; Wilson, supra note 122, 1, 3-4.
One worker, reflecting on his frustration in working a low paid, wet, difficult job, without
readily available protective equipment, stated: "In fact, most people here like it best when
things don't work right and production goes to hell, and I'm right along with them. And that's
a crummy way to waste your working time." Steve Turner, Night Shift in a Pickle Factory,
in MORAL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 3, 7-8 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1987).
159. See McAndrew, spra note 28, at 142-43
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
4 (1989). A survey in the 1970's showed that 69% of New Zealand companies never inform
employees of company plans, objectives, or the like. It also showed that 93% of New Zealand
managers believe they alone are responsible for company policy. Brian Brooks, Works
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In its handbook discussing employee involvement programs, the
NZEF states that "the effect of consultation should be to achieve the co-
operation of employees in . . . the implementation of management
decisions." It does not envision these programs as providing employees
with influence over workplace decisions."' s More recently, the NZEF
stated "that in New Zealand employee involvement [should] be seen as a
matter that is the direct concern of employees and employers, without
formal union involvement."" It recommended that the LRA be amended
to "reflect a general movement towards the decentralisation of industrial
relations;" that it concern workplace issues and not "critical area of
finance, investment or other risk decisions."' s
Similarly, NZBR's submission to the Minister of Labour concerning
legislation on "industrial democracy" or employee participation saw no
place for such participation as it is commonly understood." s Instead it
Committees and Industrial Relations, 1976 N.Z.L.J. 92, 92.
163. See NZEF, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEw ZEALAND WORKPLACE: AN
INTRODUCTION AND GUIDE TO WORKER PARTICIPATION 35 (1977); see also THE EMPLOYER
(N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Oct. 1989, at 2.
164. THE EMPLOYER (N.Z. Employers Federation, Wellington, N.Z.), Oct. 1989, at 2.
165. Id. The strength of these employer feelings was evidenced in September and October
1989, when NZ Railways Corporation decided to layoff part of its work force permanently.
The Seamen's Union requested bargaining over the issue, as was their right under the LRA.
The employer refused and proceeded to layoff several seamen. The union then engaged in an
illegal stoppage that put a halt to the essential service of ferry sailings across the Cook Strait
connecting North and South Islands. The employer sought and received equitable relief, which
was unsuccessful in forcing the union to return to work. During the week long stoppage, the
employer lost approximately $500,000 a day, and thousands of people experienced personal
and financial hardship. The employer rebuffed attempts of the union to resume at least part
of the sailings while the parties negotiated. In the end, the employer agreed to reinstate the
workers and engage in the negotiations it should have undertaken in the first place. See NZ
Railways Corporation v. NZ Seamen's Union IUOW, WLC 88C/89 (Oct. 6, 1989) (N.Z.); NZ
Railways Corporation v. NZ Seamen's Union IUOW, WLC 88B/89 (Sep. 29, 1989) (N.Z.);
NZ Railways Corporation v. NZ Seamen's Union IUOW, WLC 88A/89 (Sep. 28, 1989)
(N.Z.); NZ Railways Corporation v. NZ Seamen's Union IUOW, WLC 88/89 (Sep. 27, 1989)
(N.Z.).
A similar example of lawlessness was undertaken by the government owned Shipping
Corporation of NZ, which, when it could not obtain concessions from its unions, set up a sham
sale to a foreign corporation, left its seamen off at various islands in the Pacific, and took on
new crews at far reduced rates. See NZ Seamen's Union IUOW v. Shipping Corp. of NZ,
Ltd., WLC 6/89 (Feb. 28, 1989) (N.Z.); NZ Seamen's Union IUOW v. Shipping Corp. of
NZ, Ltd., ALC 2/89 (Feb. 2, 1989) (N.Z.); Fuday, Ltd. v. NZ Harbours IUOW, ALC 1/89
(Jan. 26, 1989) (N.Z.); see also NZ Meat Processors IUOW v. Fortex Group, Inc., NZILR
787 (Well. 1987) (N.Z.); NZ Public Service Assoc. v. Board of Electricity Corp of NZ, Ltd.,
NZILR 706 (Well. 1987) (N.Z.).
166. NEw ZEALAND BusxHEss ROUNDTABLE, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: A CASE FOR
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
argued: "The critical issues to address from the point of view of
facilitating 'meaningful participation' include the right of workers to
decide whether or not to join a union, and the right of workers to decide
which union will represent them, and how ... ."167
These attitudes conflict with employee desires for more control over
their work-life and suggest that such programs are unlikely to succeed.
They do help explain the underlying thrust behind the program of changes
advocated: permitting employers absolute sway. They want this, the
associations complain, because unions block the operational changes they
seek.
If unions do act in this way, however, it does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that there is a crisis within the system. Some studies
suggest that unions do not block legitimate change when they are provided
information, equity, and access to decision making. They do, however,
when the employment relationship is characterized by suspicion.1 68 It is
natural to blame unions for blocking changes management might like to
make 69 and for management to be frustrated by encroachments on their
ability to take unilateral action. 70 Indeed, some studies indicate that
management is more often responsible for inefficient labour utilization. 7'
Furthermore, unilateral action increases resistance by leaving unions
unable to respond on any other level than protecting job security and
worker earnings. 72
Other countries have found that unions make important contributions
to business success. For example, the effectiveness of employee
involvement programs in improving quality and productivity, as judged by
REGULATION OR DEREGuLATIoN? 22 (1989).
167. Id. In fact, the entire document is more or less a restatement of the views submitted
concerning the LRA.
168. See WILLMAN, supra note 105, at 106-07; see also FREEMAN & MEIDOFF, supra note
97, at 174-75.
169. Cf. WHIrE PAPER, supra note 18, at 1-2.
170. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 97, at 73. It has been noted that employers
have failed to rely "upon managerial competence to get them out of conflict situations"
preferring to rely instead on legal penalties. See NZ SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 12, 13.
171. A 1976 British survey of the causes of inefficient labour use found that of the 26
studies surveyed, 21 identified management failures as a cause, and 10 identified them as the
key cause; nine identified unsatisfactory employer-union negotiating procedures as a cause; 14
identified union restrictive practices but none found it to be a key cause. See WILLMAN, supra
note 105, at 55-59. 'Willman also concluded British managers created unnecessary anxiety
among workers facing technological change and displacement, which in turn led to less
efficient and satisfactory resolutions. Id. at 59.
172. See WILLMAN, supra note 105, at 166.
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management, can be increased by the percentage of the work force which
is unionized. 73 Recent studies in the United States have found that a
unionized work force increases productivity by one to two percent.174 This
level of improved productivity, however, is highly sensitive to the state of
labor-management relations. 75
In addition to improving worker attitudes, collective bargaining can
force management to think through contemplated changes and seriously
explore alternatives in order to present a clear case for the union. 76
Added deliberation may save management from dashing to implement
every newly attractive trend. They may gain a clearer understanding of
the ramifications of the contemplated change. A study of New Zealand
negotiators' attitudes found that after engaging in the process of
negotiation, the bargainers gained an appreciation for the validity of the
goals of the other side. 77
It cannot be assumed on the basis of past experience that the decisions
made by employers will be wise ones. The efficient productive system
employer organizations claim will emerge once the fetters of the current
labour system are removed is likely to be a phantom. New Zealand is
increasingly dominated economically by large firms owned by institutional
shareholders as financial investments rather than as productive
enterprises. 178  Particularly when companies are held as financial
investments, they tend to pay attention to the short term and neglect the
long term of investment and innovation1 79 at great cost to society. In
173. See Cooke, supra note 141, at 313.
174. See generally LARRY MISCHEL & PAULA VoOS, UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS (1992). This effect is attributed to lower quit rate caused by the grievance
system with features such as seniority, which increase employees' security, and feelings of
having their voice heard, see FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 97, at 95-109; Richard
Freeman, The Effect of Unionism on Worker Attachment to Firms, 1 J. LAB. RES. 30, 31
(1980), and also to a change in management attitudes with more cooperation in matters such
as introducing new technology. See id. at 174-75. Such an effect was anticipated by the IC
& A Act. See DAVID PEARSON & DAVID THORNS, ECLIPSE OF EQUALITY: SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION IN NEw ZEALAND 138-39 (1983).
175. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 97, at 176.
176. See Willman, supra note 105, at 45.
177. See DAVID SMITH & DON TURKINOTON, A PROFILE OF VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN NEW ZEALAND 11 (1981).
178. See Kirk, Towards an Alternate Economic Strategy, in NEW ZEALAND LABOUR
PERSPECTIVES: THE CHALLENGE OF THE THIRD DEPRESSION 53, 59 (Peter Davis, ed. 1981);
see also James Weir, Lawyer Criticises Securities Law Proposals, DOMINION, Nov. 30, 1989,
at 7.
179. See BROSNAN & WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 54.
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short, equality of power tends to result in more effective bargaining,
whereas approaching negotiations with an attitude of overreaching is more
likely to lead to deadlock.18
Uncovering the moral and political vision embedded in the proposals
for law reform which the New Zealand employer associations advanced
does not reveal the enchanting imagistic portrait they would like us to be
mesmerized by. The inner logic reveals a somber portrait of country
which will feature unilateral, oligarchic employer control, fostered by laws
which promote the elimination of less powerful competitors and which
relegate powerless unions to a peripheral role. The portrait will be filled
out with workers existing on lower wages and forced into powerlessness.
It will be a society in which deregulation will serve as a hyper-ratification
of its current hierarchy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Analyzing employer association proposals is a troubling exercise. The
major source of the disquietitude one feels, correctly or incorrectly, is that
one does not expect the level of either inaccuracy or duplicity they display.
Their claims are, in most cases, demonstrably false. Even more, they
reveal a program that is at odds with the one the associations advanced.
Their analyses always overlook explanations which more easily account for
New Zealand's recent economic problems, including such as the effect of
changes in the world economy with which New Zealand has had to cope
in the past decade and New Zealand's situation as a small country
producing mainly agricultural products in a relatively isolated geographic
location. They also overlook available evidence that New Zealand has
come through this period with less upheaval than many other countries of
its size."'
Furthermore, the employer associations turn to inapt comparisons with
countries such as the United States, Japan, and Switzerland, countries with
far larger populations, better infrastructure, guest worker immigration
policies, or more favorable locations-all of which better explain their
superior economic performance than peculiar nuances of their industrial
relations systems ever could. If the importance of these factors has
actually escaped the notice of the associations, composed as they are of the
180. See JOHN DEEKS & PETER BOXALL, LABOUR RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 216-17
(1989). When negotiations are approached with threats or when one party has caused the other
to lose face, the result is increased suspicion and a desire to inflict revenge even at the cost of
economic loss or personal damage. Id. at 217.
181. See Rose, supra note 92, at 65, 67.
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people and institutions which shape New Zealand's economic life, that in
itself may go far to explain any other failings experienced by their
respective enterprises.
Examining the employer associations' cries for reform leads to the
conclusion that they are actually an attack on the existence of unions as
bodies with any sort of authority or power and an attempt to aggrandize
the power of the corporations. The real story told by this examination of
the program advanced by the New Zealand employer associations is quite
different from that which they claim for it. It is a story of an attempt to
assure a future with unilateral employer control of labor relations, the
elimination of weaker competitors by the largest, most powerful
companies, the relegation of weakened, powerless unions to a peripheral
role. It is a story, not of respect for workers, but of an attempt to assure
that they are paid lower wages and are docile and compliant in relation to
those employing them. Finally it is a story in which the battle cry of
deregulation stands for a strategy of not only ratifying the current
hierarchy, but of assuring its consolidation and perpetuation.
The public portrait presented by the employer associations is a
pleasant one, done in Impressionistic pastels. X-ray examination reveals
that which has been painted over was done in more somber tones and
chiaroscuro.
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Appendix:
An Overview of the Legislative Scheme
of the Labour Relations Act 1987
In order to understand the terms of the current debate in New
Zealand, it is essential to outline its contemporary legislation. The basic
features of the original statute still exist in the Labour Relations Act 1987
(the "LRA"). Its fundamental feature is the Registrar of Unions whose
duty it is to register worker organizations as representatives with exclusive
negotiating rights.1 12 The consequences of choosing to register or not, are
more far reaching than the certification of unions by the National Labor
Relations Board. The process is quite simple and straightforward. Unions
apply to the Registrar, with the name of the proposed union, a list of
members and representatives of the group (with their occupation and locus
of work), and written evidence in the form of a copy of a resolution
passed by a majority of the members or its equivalent that they desire
registration as a union.
1 3
The Registrar has authority not only to register unions but also their
rules, which essentially define which classifications and locations of
workers are represented."' Registration is not automatic. If the Registrar
determines they are unreasonable, undemocratic, unfairly discriminatory
or prejudicial, or contrary to law they are refused registration in whole or
in part. 8 5 As in prior legislation, previously unrepresented work places
gain union representation by the union's registering its amended coverage,
following a ballot of its membership."8 6
182. Labour Relations Act, §§ 3-7 (1987) (N.Z.). From 1894, registration has been the
key element of the New Zealand labor relations system. Woods, supra note 3, at 98, 101.
Unions can choose to register and come under the relevant legislation, but those who chose
to forego registration-and there have always been some-suffer certain disadvantages: (1)
They can only negotiate contracts binding the parties to them and with no life beyond their
expiration; (2) they have no access to the industrial courts. The parties shoulder the costs of
negotiation, rather than the government; and (3) they also are subject to the danger of
predation by other unions. Id.
183. Labour Relations Act, § 9 (1987) (N.Z.).
184. Id. § 10.
185. Id. § 40.
186. Id. §§ 15, 98-107. Demarcation disputes are handled in a similar manner if the
Labour Court determines that two or more unions have coverage of the disputed work.
There, the ballot is limited to the workers performing the disputed work. Id. §§ 5, 108-09.
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A second basic feature is the registration procedure for employers'
organizations, originally employer unions under the IC & A Act.
18 7
These two types of registered organizations are seen as equals.
The major change in the LRA concerning unions is the requirement
that unions have minimum memberships of 1000. " Unions which fall
below that minimum are in danger of having their registration
cancelled.' 89 Upon cancellation, the document covering workers remains
in effect for its specified term plus one additional year, unless it is
superseded or replaced by another applicable document."9  Lack of
registration does not necessarily mean the union no longer exists as a
representative; only that it has lost the ability to function within the
legislative scheme.
A second change is that the LRA empowers its industrial judicial
body, now the Labour Court, with, not only primary jurisdiction over
labour matters, but also full judicial powers, including the ability to
enforce its own orders. 91 In cases involving personal grievances or
demarcation disputes, each of the five Labour Court judges sits with two
lay panel members, appointed respectively by union and employer
associations." z Their function is to advise the judges in cases requiring
industrial relations expertise.' 93
187. Id. §§ 17-20. The principal registered employer association is the NZEF, an umbrella
and coordinating organization of its constituents. It publishes a quarterly newsletter, The
Employer. See generally Rudman, supra note 75, at 54; Brosnan et al, supra note 52, at 10.
The NZBR, in contrast, is an unregistered organization composed of chief executives of
the approximately 30 major New Zealand businesses, which together represent approximately
10% of the work force or 200,000 workers. See 1987 SuBMISSIoN, supra note 51, at app.
188. Labour Relations Act, § 30 (1987) (N.Z.).
189. Id. This provision has been contested by the NZEF before the International Labour
Organization ("ILO"). Reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association Series B No.2,
72 Official Bulletin 265 (International Labour Organization 1989). As of 1983, the government
found that 2/3 of all unions had a membership below 1000. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 9,
at 16.
190. Labour Relations Act, § 34 (1987) (N.Z.).
191. Id. §§ 279-307. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 18, at 19; Vranken & Hince, supra note
19, at 117. See also New Zealand Labourers' Union v. Fletcher Challenge, Ltd., 1 N.Z.L.R.
520, 523, 524 (C.A. 1988) (N.Z.); Daily Freightways, Ltd. v. Northern Industrial District
Distribution IUOW, 1 N.Z.L.R. 513, 519 (Auck. High Ct. 1988) (N.Z.).
192. Labour Relations Act, §§ 108, 217 (1987) (N.Z.). See WiYrE PAPER, supra note 18,
at 18.
193. Vranken & Hince, supra note 19, at 116.
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The LRA gives unions broad rights of information and entry; upon
request, they are entitled to a list of the names, addresses, and jobs or
classification of covered workers."9 A union official can enter an
employer's premises if the union believes the employer employs workers
covered under the union's membership rule in order to interview them,
request them to join the union, or collect fees or other charges due.
19 5
Refusal to allow the union official to enter is an offense carrying a fine of
no more than $NZ1000. 1' Union officials are entitled to information as
to workers' type of work, the document under which the worker is being
employed, the classification of the worker, the worker's hours and days
of work, and the wages paid each worker." A union official can also
enter to ascertain if an employer is violating the terms of the applicable
agreement or award. 9 8
The LRA also goes farther than United States law to permit union
activity in the workplace. Employers are required to allow union
members paid time to attend two union meetings a year of no more than
two hours each," commonly referred to as "stopwork meetings."
The most often amended provisions have been those pertaining to
union membership. The LRA requires that, when an award or agreement
has a union membership provision, any adult worker must become a
member within fourteen days of being requested to by the union.2" Such
a provision can be inserted into an award or agreement either by
negotiation between the employer and union or through a secret ballot.
20 1
A ballot cannot be conducted more often than every third award or
agreement, and it is overseen by the Registrar.20 2
194. Labour Relations Act, § 54 (1997) (N.Z.).
195. Id. § 55.
196. Id. § 56. Formerly, the Inspector of Awards enforced awards and contracts and
inspected time and wage books. Under the LRA, unions were given these duties and
accordingly were allowed to enter and inspect the books. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 9,
at 24.
According to the NZBR, although employers had feared abuse of this right, this did not
occur. REviEw, supra note 41, at 13.
During this period, the value of the US dollar to the NZ dollar was roughly
$1.00=$NZ1.60.
197. Labour Relations Act, § 194 (1987) (N.Z.). Failure to provide the information
subjects the offender to a fine of not more than $NZ2000. Id. § 195.
198. id. § 196.
199. Id. § 57.
200. Id. § 58.
201. Id. § 69.
202. Id. §§ 61-68.
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becoming a member of any union or of a particular union. 203 For all who
lack such an exemption, failure to become a member within fourteen days
of request permits the employer to dismiss the person. 2" Both unions and
employers are subject to a fine of up to $2000 for exerting undue influence
to persuade a worker to become or refuse to become a member of a
union.
205
The process by which terms and conditions are determined is far more
complex than those in the United States. First, a Tripartite Wage
Conference is held each year with representatives of unions, employers,
and the government to consult concerning the economic environment in
which wages will be settled in the coming year and the government's
economic policies. 2" The parties examine inflation, the distribution of
incomes, the competitiveness of the government's economic policies, the
level of employment, and any other relevant matters.20 7 The Conference
then makes nonbinding recommendations for the next wage round.2 °8
Negotiations can take place in several formats. "Awards" are most
commonly an occupation based agreement. These have heretofore been
the principal form and are negotiated between a union and employers'
organization whose members employ covered workers. Awards bear some
resemblance to multi-employer agreements but on a more extensive scale.
Awards can be national or regional in scope.2°' Within their jurisdiction,
they also cover employers or workers performing covered work, even if
they were not in existence at the time the award was created. 210
Awards play a vital role in the unionization of some industries. New
Zealand is a sparsely settled country with small work sites. Travel is
difficult through much of the country with vital links in some places being
dependent on one-lane gravel roads. Thus, negotiations on a workplace by
workplace basis would, at the least, be very difficult.
203. Id. §§ 73-94.
204. Id. §§ 71, 95. But cf Northern Clinical & Legal Employees Administrative and
Related Workers IUOW v. Hemant Patel, 32 N.Z.L.R. 89 (ALC 1989) (N.Z.).
205. Labour Relations Act, § 72 (1987) (N.Z.).
206. Id. §§ 121-28.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 129.
209. Id. §§ 132-34. In 1987, the Minister of Labour took a fairly positive view of the 383
awards in existence. He noted that the awards ensured at least a minimum common standard
and protections for a substantial portion of employees doing the same job, thus constraining
the bidding down of wages, decreasing employer wage competition, and resolving a large
number of disputes in one set of negotiations. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 9, at 22.
210. Labour Relations Act, § 160 (1987) (N.Z.). This is referred to as the "blanket
coverage" right of registered unions.
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Awards are negotiated following notice to the Chief Mediator, who
designates a mediator to facilitate negotiations.211 The mediator then
arranges for up to ten people to represent each side in what is referred to
as a conciliation council. 212 Any agreement they reach is then registered
as an award.21 3 If the parties are unable to agree, the dispute is referred
to the Arbitration Commission which can, but only if the parties agree,
decide the dispute and make the award."" Otherwise, the Commission
only has the authority to act in the role of a mediator.21 5
A second form of negotiations occurs when individual employers are
cited out of awards for separate negotiations, with the result being that the
award does not apply to those employees.21 6 Once cited out, an employer
is not bound by any subsequent award unless both parties agree. 2 7 They
negotiate an agreement through whatever method they agree to. 218 If an
employer is not cited out and is subject to coverage by an award, but a
union nonetheless seeks to negotiate separately with the employer, the
employer can either refuse or agree to negotiate.21 9 If the employer
agrees, the resulting agreement is not registrable and the employer can
then apply for permanent exemption from the award.
22°
211. Id. § 139. The functions of the mediators are set out at §§ 251-58. Id.
212. Id. §§ 139-45. Conciliation Councils have been a feature, in varying forms, of New
Zealand's industrial legislation since its earliest days. See Woods, supra note 3, at 87-88.
213. Id. § 146.
214. Id. § 147.
215. Id. § 147. This is a major change from the original IC & A Act, which permitted the
Arbitration Court to make an award, upon appeal by one party. See Woods, supra note 3, at
86. Over time a significant uniformity in the terms of awards and fairly rigid wage patterns
among occupations resulted. Rather than setting a minimum, as it formerly did, see id. at 88-
89, the Arbitration Commission now can set only a maximum rate in an award, see Vranken
& Hince, supra note 19, at 136-37.
The arbitration commission is effectively abolished by the Employment Contracts Bill by
omission.
216. Labour Relations Act, §§ 164-65 (1987) (N.Z.).
217. Id. §§ 135-36.
218. NZ SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 52.
219. Labour Relations Act, § 152-55 (1987) (N.Z.).
220. Id. §§ 152-55. This was enacted to prevent "second tier negotiations," that is
agreements piggybacking on awards. It was felt that permitting unions to seek improvements
from individual employers over the terms of an award created a state of chaos and industrial
unrest. See FLEXIBIUTrY, supra note 28, at 40-41. During 1977-85, the average difference
between the award rate and actual rates paid was 4.7%, with differences in specific industries
varying from a low of 0.1% to 29%. Id. at 42-43. See generally Harbridge & McCaw, supra
note 28, at 150; Vranken & Hince, supra note 19, at 112.
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A third form is a composite award involving two or more unions and
two or more employers or employer organizations. It can be initiated by
either side." t This can enable an entire industry to be covered in one
document.
The final form of negotiations provided for in the LRA is a composite
agreement. A composite agreement is negotiated between one or more
employers and two or more unions.' It can only be negotiated if the
unions involved constitute at least fifty percent of those representing
workers or at least five unions, whichever is fewer.2' The Commission
has power to hear and determine any unresolved disputes. 22 A party to
a composite agreement can withdraw from it, effective upon its expiration,
and then be subject to the award or agreement which would have applied
to them but for the composite agreement. 22
The LRA spells out certain provisions which apply to all forms of
award or agreement. First, their terms can remain in effect no longer than
three years after the document's expiration date.?26 They limit what the
parties can negotiate as working hours z 7 holidays,228 and methods for
settling disputes of rights (that is disputes concerning the application or
interpretation of the document). 9  The LRA also provides detailed
requirements as to union rules, employer organization rules, balloting
rules, and grievance procedures.230
Breaches of awards are subject to fines of $2000 for the organization
involved and $200 for agents perpetuating the breach." Plaintiffs can
also seek compliance or other equitable orders from the Labour Court.232
Provisions are made, however, for the midterm negotiation of what are truly new matters.
Labour Relations Act, §§ 178-83 (1987) (N.Z.).
221. Id. § 137.
222. Id. § 166.
223. Id. § 166.
224. Id. § 166.
225. Id. § 169.
226. Id. § 171.
227. Id. § 172.
228. Id. § 173. Eleven holidays are specified.
229. Id. § 187.
230. See id. at Schedules 1-7.
231. Id. § 202.
232. Id. §§ 207-08.
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